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ABSTRACT: The long-term proposal to license building practitioners, a reality from 1
st
 March 2012, 
marks a significant retreat from the strong pioneering tradition of self-help building that historically has 
been a significant element in small-scale construction within New Zealand. The Licensed Building 
Practitioner’s Scheme (LBP) is another government initiative prompted by criticism of the systemic 
deficiencies within the NZ building industry by the 2002 Hunn Report. Its implementation restricts most 
design and construction of residential buildings to licensed personnel. 
The Government views the Licensed Building Practitionersscheme as part of an ongoing process to 
increase trade skill levels and building quality within the industry. It is also part of a process 
toshiftresponsibility for building oversight from the public to private industry, and hencelessen the 
financial burden to the New Zealand tax and ratepayer from poor supervision and decision 
makingpractices on the part of local government.  
This paper will provide a brief history of the controversy surrounding building under performance. It will 
examine the role proposed for the Licensed Building Practitioner and the role LBP’s will play within the 
building industry. Submissions on the merits of the scheme, made in response to a request for feedback 
to the Building Act Review in 2010, are examined, evaluated and compared toan industry survey 
completed six months after the scheme’s introduction in March of 2012. The paper supports the view 
that the transfer of responsibility, of which the LBP is a part, runs the risk of failure unless legislative and 
educational systems supporting the intended role have had time to coalesce and prove their 
effectiveness. 
Keywords: Leaking buildings. Building Code Policy, Construction Technology. Licensed 
Building Practitioner. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the Licensed Building Practitioner marks another turning point in the history of the 
building industry in New Zealand. First signaled in the 2004 Building Act, its introduction was an 
outcome of the deficiencies noted in the 2002 Report of the Overview Group in Weathertightness (Hunn 
2002), a report commissioned by the Government in 2002 to investigate the causes of building failure 
due to moisture ingress. The Hunn report (Hunn et al, 2002) had noted systemic personnel defects in 
the New Zealand building industry as:  
 Inadequate contract documentation 
 Inadequate trade skills and supervision on site 
 A lack of co-operation and sharing of responsibility of responsibility on site. 
The review initiative was a governmental reaction to the post Building Act lassez faire practices of the 
1990s, when entry to the building industry was still possible to anyone capable of welding a hammer.  
The damage caused to the reputation of the industry, aggravated by, but not solely due to the presence 
of unqualified personnel, was evidenced by the financial loss to thousands of owners from poor 
performing buildings constructed over that period, and from which many problems still arise. A “capable 
industry” and a “credible” LBP Scheme were seen by the industry as “key components to restoring pride 
in the industry and ensuring quality buildings” (Department of Building and Housing (B), 2010, p59).  
1.1 Background. 
The construction traditional weatherboard and brick cladding materials, common construction materials 
in NZ construction up to the 1980s, reduced as new and face sealed proprietary rigid sheet cladding 
systems and the once commonly used, but largely forgotten, traditional stucco cladding system came 
onto the market. The upsurge in the use of these “new” cladding materials coincided with other changes 
in the building industry. The running down of the apprenticeship programme, a rise in the number of 
apartment buildings under construction and a corresponding move away from traditional fixed price 
contract to other forms of construction procurement to meet the rapid growth in this particular corner of 
 the housing sector, all combined to create a period of uncertainty that saw many operators installing 
new systems and materials into often complex building forms, without the necessary background and 
training. 
In addition to this, in 1996, five years after the introduction of the first nationally binding performance 
based New Zealand Building Code in 1991, a change was made to the NZ Standard NZ3602 to allow 
the use of untreated kiln-dried pinus radiata into timber house framing. This change, which was 
subsequently retracted in 2004, had significant and long-term consequences for the NZ building 
industry.(Murphy, 2003). 
The pre Building Act environment traditionally saw inspectorate attention during construction 
concentrated on the structural aspects of the building framework, typically the structural integrity of the 
flooring, walls (including bracing) and roof. Cladding integrity and the inspection thereof were not 
considered as important elements in the checking process. Cladding design and installation methods on 
the other hand, followed well-formulated design and build procedures using materials familiar to the 
industry. By and large, for these traditional brick and timber weatherboard structures this approach to 
construction oversight was satisfactory.  
As mentioned above, the advent of more complex cladding systems, elevation profiles and larger, more 
complex structures within the domestic market in the 1980s and 1990s, along with the introduction of 
monolithic type face fixed cladding systems, cavity insulation and kiln dried chemical free timber studs 
meant this approach was no longer sufficient. Yet both designer and the local authority consent 
processor were slow to adapt to the fall off in construction quality. 
Deficiencies in the external building fabric continued to become apparent as inquiry and debate over the 
quality of construction intensified. In 2001 a report by the writer commissioned by the Building Industry 
Authority (BIA) (Murphy, 2000) that surveyed some 287 pre-purchase reports indicated some 60% of 
the dwellings inspected let in moisture through the cladding to an unacceptable degree. Whilst buildings 
in New Zealand had always leaked to some degree (NZ is a coastal climate and capable of extreme 
climate variation), what was different and new and picked up by the survey, was the significant 
percentage increase in cladding systems letting in moisture (compared to building defects) in the period 
following the introduction of the National Building Code in 1991. This can be clearly seen in Figure 1, 
where the graph columns indicating defects for the cladding case reviewed is to a similar proportion for 
all periods except the 1990s. In this last column the ratio of defects to the number of cladding cases 
reviewed increases significantly. 
 
Figure 1: Defect v Cladding Cases Murphy (2000) 
The factors briefly outlined above were not the only reason for building deficiencies. Additional 
contributory causes of poor performance identified in the HunnReport (Hunnet al, 2002) included:  
 Inadequacy in the Building Code and Approved Documents 
 Insufficient checking at building consent stage. 
 Inadequacy of building products, materials and components including evaluation of their 
suitability of fitness of purpose. 
 
The public reaction to the Hunn Report was such that Government felt compelled to put into place 
additional procedures designed to restore public confidence in the building industry. 
2.0 SUMMARY OF POST HUNN REPORT LEGISLATIONAL INITIATIVES. 
2.1 Weathertight Homes Resolution Service Act 2002et al. 
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 An early initiative was the Weathertight Homes Resolution Service Act 2002, which set up a framework 
for mediation and adjudication between owner, contractor and other stakeholders. This act was later 
replaced by the WHRS Act 2006, which came into force on 1
st
 April 2007, creating in turn the 
Weathertight Homes Tribunal, a judicially independent Tribunal providing adjudication on matters of 
weathertightness.  
Additional initiatives included the movement of the Building Industry Authority (BIA), a crown entity, from 
the Internal Affairs ministry to the more proactive Ministry of Economic Development.Government 
intentions to tighten up controls associated with building and construction were signaled in March 2003 
through this Ministry, culminating in the introduction of a major piece of new legislation. The Building Bill 
was read in Parliament on August 29
th
 2003 and came into effect as ‘The Building Act 2004’ in 
November 2004. (Murphy & Frost,2004). 
At the same time, facing strong criticism from the public and media over inadequacies in the BIA’s role 
within the ongoing saga, the government in November 2004 established the new Department of Building 
and Housing and absorbed the Building Industry Authority (BIA) functions into this new Department. 
2.2 The Building Act 2004:  
The Building Act 2004 saw a considerable tightening up of procedures and policies surrounding the 
implementation of building controls. Changes included re-introducing timber treatment requirements 
removed in 1996, upgrading the Acceptable Solution E2, a significant step to document in a prescriptive 
manner, standard domestic building practice. Changes were also made to Local Council requirements 
tightening the rules around Building Consent accreditation. They also signaled the impending 
introduction of the Licensed Building Practitioner’s scheme, the main focus of this paper.  
2.3 The Weathertight Homes Resolution Service (Financial Assistance Package) Amendment 
Bill  
The introduction of this legislation reflected apprehensions around the performance of the various 
stakeholders operating in this post 2004 environment. It also reflected Government apprehension hinted 
at within a report by Price Waterhouse Cooper in 2009 indicating the extend of repairs for poor 
performing building in New Zealand at $NZ11.3billion, and that despite lower failure rates since 2006, 
there was plenty of more bad news to come! (PriceWaterhouse Coopers, 2009) Another concern was 
the collateral damage from assessing fault, such as the assertion made in the Covec report that a 
significant proportion of cost to the country from poor quality building comes from expenses “other than 
actual repair costs.” (Irvine et al, 2010) 
Another imperative was an ethical one. The government was at pains to state that its involvement was 
one necessitated by the size and scale of the problem, rather than moral obligation:  
Even though the Government has no legal liability, the magnitude of the issue means central 
government involvement is essential if we are going to find a way forward. (Williamson, 2011) 
To the owners who qualified (there were limits to those that do) and volunteered into the scheme (it was 
not compulsory), the Government offered to pay 25 per cent of the agreed repair costs. The 
participating Territorial Authority that approved the original construction would also pay 25 per cent, 
leaving the balance (50%) to be paid by the homeowner. 
2.4  Building Act Review initiatives: 2010. 
 The reasons for the review reflected apprehensions round the performance of the various stakeholders 
operating in this post 2004 environment. Whilst not wanting to take the ‘foot off the accelerator’ in terms 
of compliance for appropriately complex structures, the Government had concerns that the parts of the 
Act were now too cumbersome, too costly to administer and not achieving the outcomes required by the 
Act’s key principles. To quote the Minister of Building, there was a need to “…strike a better balance 
between the amount of control, the level of risk, and the capability and responsibility of those involved. 
(DBH (A), 2010). 
Consultation took the form of a DBH sponsored discussion document titled Cost effective quality; the 
next generation building controls in New Zealand, and focused on: 
 Clarifying the purpose and principles of the Building Act and the requirements of the Building 
Code –implying much confusion still remains in the public domain about the nature of the Act 
and the difference between the Act and Code. 
 
  Moving to a more balanced approach to building control –thereby acknowledging there 
exists,for low risk work,an undue reliance on building consent authorities to protect consumers 
from defective building work, even when, as the document states, “the consequences of failure 
are low”. (2010, p6)  
 
 Building consumer confidence –including improving the contracting practices, more effective 
warranties involving surety as security and better access to dispute resolution. Allied to this 
was the Licensed Building Practitioner Scheme, the main focus of this paper, where the 
construction of “critical” elements of a building was to be (and now has been) limited to 
approved accredited building operators. (2010, p1) 
3.0 THE LICENSED BUILDING PRACTITIONER’ SCHEME 
3.1 Background 
The introduction of this Scheme was flagged in the 2004 review. It was, until March 2012, a voluntary 
scheme that enabled builders and trades people with a genuine track record “…to have their skills and 
knowledge formally recognized, whether they are trade-qualified or not. “ (Department of Building and 
Housing (C), 2010). With the schemes implementation in March 2012 the consequences surrounding 
licensing tightened, and since that date, persons not licensed are restricted from undertaking and 
signing off responsibility for certain types of building work, including work associated with the 
construction of the cladding system, the primary structure, including foundations and framing, and the 
design of certain types of fire systems in small to medium sized residential apartments. In 2015 this 
competency based system moves to a qualification based one, with applicants after this date needing 
the appropriate trade qualification to qualify. 
Eight license classes include Design, Site, Carpentry, Roofing, External Plastering, Bricklaying and 
Block-laying and Foundation.  
The scheme is administered by the Department of Building and Housing, who, as a part of their duties 
set the licensing standards, manage assessment, issue ID cards where necessary and maintain a public 
register.  The Department, through an appointed Registrar, administers the LBP rules that determine the 
minimum standard of competence required for each license class, updates addresses, establishes 
processes for ongoing assessment of practitioners’ current competence, and the provision of ongoing 
skills maintenance programmes. (DBH (C),2010) 
Applicants are assessed based on their ability to work within building categories of varying complexity. 
These range in general terms from simple single unit family dwellings (Category 1) to more complex 
single unit dwellings less than 10m in height (Category 2), eventually through to multi unit and 
commercial complexes greater than 10m in height. 
3.2  Summary of 2010 Submissions relating to the LBP Scheme. 
Submissions on the merits of the scheme, made in response to a request for feedback to the Building 
Act Review in 2010, suggested many respondents wanted greater building controls and an effective 
licensed regime that would achieve it. As the Summary of Submissions document noted, “.. A capable 
industry and a credible LBP Scheme was [sic] seen as key components to restoring pride in the industry 
and ensuring quality buildings” (DBH (B), 2010, p61). The building communities view was that quality in 
building had fallen to an unacceptable low level over the last 15-20 years, and if raising it meant a 
cultural change in the area of DIY, then so be it.  
Combining an effective licensing scheme with mandatory warranties and surety and better 
informed consumers undertaking ongoing maintenance will provide for better building 
outcomes (DBH (B),2010, p51) 
3.2.1 Issues associated with the competency of LBPs 
Whilst the general tone of submissions was in favour of the Scheme, A number of submissionsin 2010 
expressed apprehension about the ability of the LBP scheme to deliver improved construction quality in 
the time allowed. The low quality of present day building consent submissions and on-site supervision 
was seen as an issue: 
Department of Building and Housing and IANZ have observed a poor quality of documentation 
accompanying building consent applications across the country (DBH (B), 2010, No 373 p59).  
 Council records confirm that 49% of building consent applications contain defective 
documentation and …15% of inspections are not approved due to deficient construction 
practices on building sites. (DBH (B), 2010, No.363 p60).  
Given this perceived lack of quality, misgivings were expressed at the impending introduction of the 
scheme in 2012. A considerable number of submissions expressed a desire for a longer transition time. 
[A] transition time (eg. five/ten years) is needed to increase the knowledge and skill level of 
licensed building practitioners (DBH (B), 2010 p52). 
Some submissions were apprehensive the LBP scheme would succeed in eliminating the poor 
performing contractor. Whilst it may shift the burden of responsibility from Local Authority to site, the 
problem of quality would persist.  
Without any actual rebalancing of responsibility, the behaviours that are currently 
demonstrated in the industry will not change. Builder LBPS will continue to fail and /or avoid 
liability by going out of business, or-more concerning-builders will not take up a license at all 
and exit the industry (RMBF, 2010 p50). 
The new licensing regime will not of itself eliminate ‘cowboy’ builders, because they will be able 
to do unlicensed work or licensed work under the supervision of an LBP (CBANZ, 2010 p52). 
3.2.2 Consequences of a poorly implemented scheme 
Submissions expressed the need for an overarching guarantee of quality amongst the building fraternity, 
and an instigation of a guarantee scheme that tied quality to contractors after the project was completed 
It remains to be seen whether the licensed building practitioner regime will ensure improved 
quality building work. If the LBP system is not robust and/or a warranty or surety system does 
not work then the reduction in BCA involvement make the situation worse for building owners. 
There is in fact a risk of a repeat of the leaky building crisis (NZ Law Society, 2010 p53). 
3.2.3 Transfer of Responsibility: 
The submissions made to the Dept. of Building and Housing in 2010 contained mixed views on the 
feasibility of a “reduced role for Building Consent Authorities” as a result of the LBP initiative (this being 
one of the stated aims of the Government in wanting to review the Act). Apprehensions were expressed 
over the ability of the LBP to take over the role, and questioned how the BCA could limit its liability 
under current law.  
Yes, limit BCA oversight proportionate to risk, but within a sensible framework aligned to a 
framework of proportionate liability (Cement and Concrete Association of NZ, 2010 p25).  
Until such time as the laws governing liability and precedents are changed, BCAs may be left 
with liability/a larger than proportionate duty of care despite their legally reduced oversight role. 
(DBH (B) 2010, p26) 
3.3 The Licensed Building Practitioner’s Scheme: Has it met expectations? 
In the light of the comments made in 2010 to the Governmental Department, and to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the new legislation, a survey of five building professionals in key BCA and private 
building surveying positions were chosen for detailed interview between July and August 2012, some six 
months after the introduction of the legislation. Questions focused around the effectiveness of the new 
legislation, with subsequent questioning design to elicit information on the validity of apprehensions 
made in 2010.  
3.3.1  Question 1: Have you noticed an improvement in the quality of building consent applications 
presented since the start of the LBP scheme in March 2012? 
All recipients were of the view that the quality of building consent applications had not improved to any 
extent following the introduction of the Scheme, even though designers were required to be registered 
and required to sign Memoranda confirming the building consent application, of which their drawings 
formed the major part, complied with the Building Code.  
No, surprising how many don’t understand the LBP scheme…Ignorance about the system [is] 
across the board. (McLaughlan, 2012) 
 One respondent conceded there was some improvement, but at a cost of the Building Consent Authority 
putting up extra front line staff to ensure projects were “up to speed” prior to processing them.  
The Auckland Council [is] still picking up errors that would make the building non compliant. 
(Snape, 2012) 
The feedback seems to confirm the continued apprehension felt in Local Authority and expressed in the 
2010 submissions, that themany document errors persisting in present day applications were an 
indication accredited LBPs were still lacking the skills necessary to ensure their building consent 
applications complied with the Building Code.  
This apprehension extended to the site, where concerns over the additional bureaucracy and the lack of 
a site license meant at present all contracting trades had to take responsibility for, and sign off, their 
portion of the work, leaving the collection of the Producer Statement to the owner, not always the best 
person to receive such information. 
3.3.2 Question 2:What is your response to the following statement by the Law Society viz: “(that) if 
the LBP system is not robust and/or a warranty or surety system does not work then the reduction in 
BCA involvement will make the situation worse for building owners. There is in fact a repeat of the 
leaking building crisis” (NZ Law Society, 2010) 
All respondents agreed with this statement and reiterated that the LBP needed to be made accountable; 
if ever the BCA was to withdraw from the consent process to any significant degree. Apprehensions 
were expressed on the training of builders “..Many builders do not know what the building code is” 
(McLaughlan, 2012). Others spoke of additional legislation coming on stream (The Building Amendment 
No 3 Bill) that would act to cement the obligation to comply fully onto the LBP contractor, is so far as the 
BCA would only issue Completion Certificates, and no longer vouch for the quality of work, as is implied 
at present by them signing off the Code Compliance Certificate. To some the warranty scheme 
remained a suitable way forward, as it removed the incentive of companies to liquidate as a means to   
avoid the consequences of poor construction:  
[The] LBP in tandem with Companies involved in a warranty scheme would work. This way 
products, documentation, construction, all come under the responsibility of the one company. 
They would have the incentive to get things right, negotiate with [the] insurance company and 
move forward. (O’Sullivan, 2012). 
3.3.3 Question 3: From your experience of the LBP’s operation to date, do you think this “transfer of 
responsibility” (from the BCA) back to the building sector can be achieved. 
Responses were more mixed to this question.  There was a sense of frustration on the part of some 
respondents that they were still forced to play a greater part in the implementation of the LBP scheme 
than should be necessary. “We spend a lot of time educating builders” (Kerite, 2012). The system could 
work but there was a need for a“..good liability insurance scheme to be set up”. (Snape, 2012). 
A view common to several was that the building industry needs someone to rely on. Builders were not 
capable of it on their own and Governmental Departments, Standards NZ or BRANZ were not interested 
or capable. “The BCA (Local Authority) is the only force left. It will get dragged in anyway” (O’Sullivan, 
2012).  
There was a sense that in an ideal world this transfer of responsibility from the Building Creditation 
Authority back to the people doing the work would on balance be a good thing (not withstanding the 
remarks above), but that, in the present circumstances, such a move was extremely unlikely to work.  
4.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The Licensed Building Practitioner’s scheme has been in operation for some six months. It has removed  
the right of non-qualified and non-registered persons to undertake restricted building work, yet another 
legacy to changes brought about by Government attempts to bring additional accountability and quality 
to the beleaguered building industry still coping with the fallout from poor quality and leaking buildings.  
Feedback from qualitative research survey of fivekey building personnel indicates no significant change 
to date to the quality of building consent application or on site accountability as a result of the 
introduction of the LBP scheme. Apprehensions expressed about the quality of LBPs in 2010 remained 
valid today, six months after the scheme’s introduction. Examples were given of designers not aware of 
their obligations as licensed practitioners and of the “liability implications for signing the Memoranda” 
(Subranamiam, 2012). Building consent applications were still requiring considerable up-front checking 
on the part of the local authority staff to achieve compliance. Examples were also given of delays in 
 accreditation of licensed practitioners by the Department of Building and Housing, the managers of the 
Scheme, and hence presenting BCAs with dilemmas around eligibility of a contractor to undertake work 
All interviewees shared the same a desire for the scheme to work as the submitters did in the 2010 
submissions, even though reservations were expressed about the methods used to achieving the goals. 
Some felt the responsibility for the success of the scheme had been passed unfairly to Local Authority, 
when it should be the Licensed Practitioner’s Board taking the initiative for proper implementation. 
Others were of the view that the whole approach to minimizing risk, particularly risk to the Local 
Authority, was at the heart of the problem of responsible building. The Government was “focused on law 
and beating people into submission” (O’Sullivan, 2012) to solve the problem of poor quality building. As 
a result Local Authorities (BCAs) were now “demanding and pedantic “ in their request for information, 
because (understandably) their own liability issues have demanded this approach. The result is 
designers now spend a lot of time providing information on “things that are not necessary”.  
E2/AS1 was meant to be a document that contained all that was standard (similar to 
NZS3604), so you only had to draw special details. There has been a missed opportunity here 
to reduce the amount of unnecessary detail. (O’Sullivan, 2012). 
Comments made in the interviews suggest six months is still too early to properly ascertain meaningful 
change. The system is still “bedding in” and backlogs associated with the accreditation and licensing 
process mean a proper analysis on the scheme’s merits is still premature. The scheme is part of a 
governmental push to transfer responsibility and hence liability from the public to the private sector. The 
processes needed to complete the legal framework for this are still under consideration. Irrespective of 
legal process however, the LBP scheme that underpins this transfer of responsibility, runs the risk of 
failure unless operational and educational systems supporting the intended role for the LBP scheme 
have had time to coalesce and prove their effectiveness.  
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